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In an often-quoted passage Joan Robinson onc
e stated
that "Keynes hardly ever peered over the
edge of the short
period" (Robinson, 1978, p. 14). S
ome years earlier she had
pointed out that "(1)t was left to
Harrod to transpose The
General Theory into long-period terms" (R
obinson, 1971, p. 24).
For many, although not necessarily for Robins
on herself, Keynes
undue concentration on short period
issues was responsible for
the emergence of the neoclassical synt
hesis through which
orthodox conceptions of long-period equil
ibrium positions were
reconciled with "Keynesian" concer
ns such as unemployment and
deficiency of aggregate demand (e.g.,
Garegnani, 1978/79). Gis.
But, what would Keynes have seen if he had peered over
the edge of the short period? After all, Key
nes did emphasize the
need to develop a concept of monetary
economy where money was not
neutral in the short as in the long pe
riod:
"The theory which I desiderate would deal...wit
h an economy in
which money plays a part of its own and
affects motives and
decisions and is, in short, one of the ope
rative factors in the
situation, so that the course of events cann
ot be predicted,
either in the lon eriod or in the short, without
a knowledge of
@ behaviour of money between the tirs state and the l
ast. And
it is this which we ought to mean when we
speak of a_ monetary
economy. (Keynes, 1973, XIII, pp. 40
8/9, emphases added) .
Keynes was well aware that to find a non-neutral role
for money in strictly short-period terms was no
t sufficient to
found a new theory. Orthodox theory accepted that mone
y could be
non-neutral in the short period, when
agents could not discern
the real determinants behind nominal changes.
Keynes's own Tract
on Monetary Reform, published in 1923, illustrate
d how easily
orthodox theory could absorb this sort of non-neutrality.
Clearly, there was no need for a "short-period revoluti
on" in
these terms. As Keynes put it later, it was in connection with
accumulation that orthodox theory failed (2) and where,
therefore, the need for a new approach was most felt. Thus, just
to state that Keynes was not concerned with the long period
because "he used to say (it was) a subject for undergraduates"Taduates"
(Robinson, 1978, p. 14) is not sufficient to dispose of
the
subject. Keynes was concerned with the long period and it is
in
the context of long period mecanisms that he est
ablished the
reasons for effective demand failures, in chapter
17 of The
General Theory. If Keynes decided nevertheless to fr
ame his
model in short period terms he must have had stronger rea
sons
than mere idiosyncratic preferences. In this paper, a hypoth
esis
is offered as to what these reasons could be. Initially,
the
meaning of long period is discussed with reference to Marsha
ll's
views. Marshall is important in this connection
both as the
creator of the explicit dichotomy between short and long period
and as Keynes's teacher. The relation between the concepts of
period and run is described and how they relate to the not
ion of
equilibrium. In the following section, Keynes's own arguments as
to the adequacy of the notion of long period are examine
d.
Finally, we discuss how to reconcile a model that tries to
assume the point of view of actual decision-makers with the study
of issues like accumulation of capital, technological progress,
eck.
1 - The Meaning of "Long Period"
In the Keynesian tradition (including what Joan
Robinson called “bastard keynesianism")long period analysis has
been identified to the construction of growth models. Starting
with Harrod's "dynamic model" (Harrod, 1939), a vast literature
was developed "generalizing" The General Theory- Harrod's
initial attempt was an effort to extend Keynes's equilibrium
conditions (presented in chapter 3 of the GT), that were
defined
for a given moment, to a string of moments. According to Harrod,
in an extended sequence of time, one had to take into
consideration not only shifts in aggregate demand but also
changes of productive capacity. In a given mo
ment, the
equilibrium condition was that demand for capital goods should be
enough to absorb that share of produced income that was
not
destined to consumption. In a string of moments, the equ
ilibrium
condition was the same, provided one took into consideration that
it would require an increasing real demand to occupy 4”
increasing productive Capacity.
As Kregel (1971) has shown, the feature of
Harrod's
mode] that became best known, the knife's
edge problem, that is
the instability of its equilibrium position
, was a different
issue. The concentration of the subseque
nt literature on the
latter problem has given a direction
to growth analysis that was
very different of its starting point.
Adopting a form of
Samuelson's correspondence principle
(Samuelson, 1979), the two
main strands of keynesian thought (Kaldori
an models developed in
Cambridge, England, and Solowian
models in Cambridge,
Massachusetts) dedicated themselves
to the examination of the
stability characteristics of growth
models on the understanding
that they described not only formal c
onsistency requirements of
models but actual behaviors of
agents.(3) Stability in this
sense, however, fs a purely f
ormal issue. It does not
necessarily refer to actual behaviors n
or to actual mechanisms
through which the economy really r
eaches a given position.
Stability analysis actually employs eq
uilibrium relations to
explain behavior out of equilibrium, when
agents are not supposed
to possess the information that i
s necessary to derive the
equilibrium relations themselves. It 1s alwa
ys possible to define
new functional forms to make it possible
to establish new
stability properties of the models without any
real change in the
underlying picture of the actual e
conomy. Samuelson's
correspondence principle is thus compl
etely misleading in
economics, whatever may be its merits i
n other sciences. It is
hard to see how modern "growth econo
mics" could escape being
classified by Keynes as another
of those "pretty polite
techniques" that did not touch the
"real world" that concerned
him (4) (5).
Originally, however, "long period" did
not refer to
growth analysis (Kregel, 1983, p- 345).
On the contrary, the
notion was used to describe "resting" posi
tions the economy was
supposed to reach once unsystematic influences or disturbance
s
could be ruled out (Garegnani,
1976).
Classical value theory was concerned with these
positions when it took "natural" prices as opposed to "market"
prices as its subject. The distinction between the two,
was not in terms of periods, but of the
determinants. Natural prices were
however,
Nature of their
seen to be rooted in the
permanent, systemic elements of the economy
. In contrast,
"(m)arket prices were believed to be
influenced by a variety of
forces - uncertainty, harvest failure,
monopoly and so on - and
thus were not amenable to analysis in terms of
systematic forces,
as were natural prices" (Eatwell, 1977, p. 64n).
The dichotomy assumed a definite tempo
ral content with
Marshall who changed the meaning of mark
et and natural prices
into short and long period equilibrium pr
ices (Bharadwaj, 1978).
The fundamental change that was operated w
ith the new framework
was that now both types of prices were “a
menable to analysis"
and a very definite relationship was established
between them
(6). Short and Long Period were distinguished
by the type of
restriction under which equilibrium was determ
ined. As Marshall
put it:
"for short periods people take the stock of appliance
s for
production as practically fixed; and they are governed by
their
expectations of demand in considering how actively they sha
ll set
themselves to work those appliances. In long periods they set
themselves to adjust the flow of these appliances to their
expectations of demand for the goods the appliances help to
produce". (Marshall, 1920,, pp. 310/1).
From this Marshall concluded that demand factors would
determine value in the short period while cost of production
would be the main determinant in the long. This is so because in
the short period:
"(t)he supply of specialized skill and ability, of suitable
machinery and other material capital, and of the appropriate
industrial organization has not time to be fully adapted to
demand; but the producers have to adjust their supply to the
demand as best they can with the appliances already at their
disposal" (Marshall, 1920, pp. 312/3).
Clearly, the real logical distinction refers to
the
Testrictions imposed on agents in each situation. The time
aspect derives from the necessary delays in fully adjusting
Productive conditions to expected demand:
"In long periods...all investments of
capital and effort in
providing the material plant and the orga
nization of a business,
and in acquiring trade knowledge and speci
alized ability, have
time to be adjusted to the inco
mes which are expected to be
earned by them: and the estimates of th
ose incomes therefore
directly govern supply, and are the
true long-period normal
supply price of the commodities pr
oduced" (Marshall, 1920, Pp.
313).
Long period analysis, thus, does not re
fer to the study
of actual processes but to the d
egree of "completeness" with
which productive conditions are adap
ted to the demand profile. It
refers to what agents would d
o if they could know from the
beginning what demand structure w
ould prevail. This would
determine "normal" values, th
e ones that agents would recogn
ize
as adequate to prevailing material
conditions, and therefore no
further change would be sought
for.
Duration matters only subsidiarily to
the dichotomy
between short and long period. As a
matter of fact we can always
see through a short period equili
brium configuration to identify
which would be its long period counte
rpart, just by relaxing the
number of restrictions under whic
h we find the short period
solutions. It does not mean, howev
er, that we can as well to
describe the dynamics of change that wo
uld take us from the short
to the long period situation. This woul
d take a run of time that
depending on the data of the pro
blem could be infinite. If not,
long period "normal" values would eme
rge in “the long run", that
are the values
"which economic forces would bring a
bout if the general
conditions of life were stati
onary for a run of time long en
ough to
enable them all to work out their
full effect" (Marshall, 1920,
p. 289).
However, as Marshall recognized,
“_..we cannot foresee the future perfectly.
The unexpected may
happen; and the existing tendencies may b
e modified before they
had time to accomplish what appears to be their
full and complete
work. The fact that the general conditions of
life are not
stationary is the source of many of the difficul
ties that are met
with in applying economic doctrines to practi
cal problems"
(Marshall, 1920, Pp. 289).
The time "run" that may be necessary to establish long
period values may then exceed what is allowed by the actual
operation of the economy. It may even be infinite if the
adaptation processes that are triggered are not convergent to
long period equilibrium. Thus, there is no direct equivalence
between "long run" analysis, which contains a definite duration
aspect, and "long period" analysis which does not. (7) Long
period inconsistencies may be present in short period situations,
and this may be enough to trigger adaptive changes. As Joan
Robinson noted, this happens all the time:
"Long-period changes are going on in short-period situations.
Changes in output, employment and prices, taking place with a
given stock of capital, are short-period changes; while changes
in the stock of capital, the labour force and the techniques of
production are long-period changes. ...A given short-period
situation contains within itself a tendency to long-period
change. (Robinson, 1969, p. 180).
This goes in the same direction as proposed by
Marshall:
"For the element of Time, which is the centre of the chief
difficulty of almost economic problem, is itself absolutely
continuous: Nature knows no absolute partition of time into long
periods and short; but the two shade into one another by
imperceptible gradations, and what is a short period for one
problem, {s a long period for another." (Marshall, 1920, p. vii).
Marshall's interest in the long period is related to
the idea of normality:
"normal results are those which may be expected as the outcome
of those tendencies which the context suggests; or, in other
words, which are in accordance with those "statements of
tendency", those Laws or Norms which are appropriate to the
context. This is the point of view from which it is said that
normal economic action is that which may be expected In the long
Tun under certain conditions (provided those condit{ons are
persisten Tom fe members of an industrial group." (Marshall,
1920, p. 28).
Marshall wanted to combine the classical concern with
"natural" values’ and the emerging neoclas
sical focus on
individual conduct. Classical Political
Economy knew no analysis
of individual decisions and behaviors.
Classes were defined by
thelr "objective" function in the op
eration of the economy.
There were no micro-analyses of behavior.
As long as capitalism
remained capitalism, capitalists would
accumulate, workers would
produce surplus values and landlords
would consume part of
aggregate surplus. Economic “laws" we
re supposed to be as
objective as these roles. Decisions
could not change them.
The English neoclassical tradition, however,
“unlike
the European tradition,...was more concerne
d with the analysis of
actual markets and market institutions"
(Kregel, 1977, p. 496).
This meant, according to Keynes, "to en
ter the vast laboratory of
the world, to hear its roar and distinguish
the several notes, to
speak with the tongues of businessmen"(CWIJMK
, X, p. 187).
Economic laws had to become beha
vioral laws. Individuals took
decisions and acted under uncertainty. Thus,
they could not be
conceived as consciously following up
any pre-set long-run plan.




degree Marshall introduced the idea
of "normality":
u)..we may say that the course of action which
may be expected
under certain conditions from the members of an
industrial group
is the normal action of the members of that g
roup relatively to
those conditions." (Marshall, 1920,
p. 28, his emphases).
In this way, long period and long run became twin
concepts for Marshall, because he proposed
that long period
normal results were those to be obtained
in the long run when
conditions were stable enough to allow
agents to make their
normal choices in face of those condition
s. Nevertheless, as
seen above, the two notions are conceptual
ly different and
logically independent. Long period results can be define
d
independently of their being achieved in the long run in the s
ame
sense that natural values can be defined independently of there
being any forces leading market prices to converge to them over
time. Long period values can always be defined for any given
environment even though there may be not any finite run that m
ay
lead to their attainment.
Keynes noted that Marshall's distinctlon between short
and long period was “path-breaking". But he added that "this Is
the quarter in which, in my opinion, the Marshall analysis 1s
least complete and satisfactory, and where there remains most to
do." (CWIMK, X, p. 207). We may venture the hypothesis that
Keynes objection may have had to to with the identification of
long period with long run and thus with the gravitation process
that unifies both notions. This is explored in the next section.
2. Keynes, the Long Period and the Long Run
The long period was thus important to Marshall because
it was the way to reconcile the search for long run "constants"
with the behavioral analysis of actual markets that concerned
Marshall. The notion of normality was fundamental to justify the
possibility of stable equilibria, whenever conditions were
sufficiently permanent to allow agents to find their most
desired positions. Long period results, in this sense, could
always be defined; whether they could be actually reached
depended on the degree of permanence of their determining
conditions.
Keynes, like Marshall, also saw the long period as the
realm of full equilibrium. When discussing a paper submitted by
Kalecki for publication in The Economic Journal, in 1941, Keynes
asked Joan Robinson whether it was "not rather odd when dealing
with ‘long run’ problems to start with the assumption that
all
firms are always working below capacity"
(CWIMK, XII, p. 829).
When she replied that Kalecki was working with a different
view
of the long period, Keynes retorted that
"If he is extending the General Theory beyond the sh
ort period
but not to the long period in the old sense, he really must tell
us what the sense Js. For I am still innocent enough to be
bewildered by the idea that the assumption of all firms
always
working below capacity is consistent with 'a l
ong-run problem ‘."
(Id., pp. 830/1).
When developing the concept of Monetary Economy, on
which The General Theory was to be founded, Keynes
observed that
Marshall had not “explicitly settled" the mea
ning of long period
equilibrium. He saw three possible
ways to define it:
"The first suggestion conveyed by the term ‘long-
period’ is that
it relates to a position towards which forc
es spring up to
influence the short period position whenever
the latter has
diverged from it. The second suggestion conve
yed is that the
long-period position differs from short-period positi
ons in being
a stable position capable cet.par. of being su
stained, whilst
short-period positions are cet.par. unstabl
e and cannot be
sustained. The third suggestion is that the lo
ng-period position
is, in some sense, an optimum or ideal position fr
om the point of
view of production, i.e. a position in whic
h the forces of
production are disposed and utilised to t
heir best possible
advantage" (CWIMK, XXIX, p. 54).
The third meaning of long period corresponds to its
traditional usage, equating it with the accepted notion of l
ong
run equilibrium. The second meaning allow
s for a view of
normality which considers Marshall's recogniti
on that "of course
Normal does not mean Competitive" (Mars
hall, 1920, p. 289). As a
result, there may be persistent
situations which do not
necessarily represent the best use of resour
ces. Of course, in
the very long run no monopoly can s
urvive and one can thus
suppose that the second and the third mea
nings of long period
would collapse into o
ne.
The first meaning is weaker. In it one recognizes only
that there may be some stimuli to cha
nge implicit in a given
situation even if it represents a short period equilibr
ium. This
is the case of the short-period equilibrium bet
ween supply and
demand being coexistant with a desire to change the stocks of
capital equipment in use. The concept does not refer to a
terminal but to an initial position and reactions to it that are
{mplicity contained in its construction. (8) This is the sense
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Keynes actually used the notion of long period, both
before and
after the General Theory, with one relevant exception that
was
the concept of long-period employment, presented in c
hapter 5 of
Ihe General Theory, to be refered to below.
In the discussion of meanings presented above Keynes
did not try to solve the ambiguity of the concept, choosing
instead to focus his criticism on the "uniqueness" of the
equilibrium position:
"for the root of the objection which I find to the theory under
discussion, if it is propounded as a long-period theory, lies in
the fact that, on the one hand, it cannot be held that the
position towards which the economic system {is tending or the
position at which it would be at rest or the optimum position
.., whichever of these tendencies we have in view, is entirely
independent of the policy of the monetary authority; whilst, on
the other hand, it cannot be maintained that there is a unique
policy which, in the long run, the monetary authority is bound to
pursue" (CWJMK, XXIX, pp. 54/5) (9).
This criticism has nothing to do with the first meaning
of long period which does not specify the nature of the final
equilibrium position. It touches directly, on the other hand, on
the orthodox way of equating long period normality with long run
equilibrium.
At this point, one should have in mind how can monetary
policy have the kind of long-period influence Keynes expected
that is, affecting the "course of events". It did so by
exercising a lasting impact on the accumulation of capital. Money
could be a substitute for real capital assets in the portfoli
os
of agents. Differently from Wicksell, who focused on the role of
credit sustaining the purchase of investment goods to have
monetary policy affecting investment, Keynes approached this
process emphasizing the role of money as an asset, absorbing
demand that otherwise could be directed to productive
assets.
Under certain conditions, it could be more attractive
to retain
liquid assets than income-generating, capital assets. a
confidence on the expectations of returns
from the latter is
weak, agents may prefer the safety that liquid assets confer to
their holders. (10)
ll
The quality of money of being an asset, according to
Keynes, derives from the uncertainty that
surrounds private
economic decisions under capitalism (11).
The liquidity of money
lies in its unique capacity to liquidate de
bts (CWJMK, V, p. 1;
Keynes, 1964, pp- 236/7). It is because ot
her assets are subject
to income or capital risks that money,
the legal tender and its
closest substitutes, has
a "return".
Uncertainty is particularly strong in r
elation to
investment in long-lived capital a
ssets, where current conditions
cannot give the decision-maker t
he relevant information about th
e
future to orient his acts. This d
oes not mean that agents cannot
perceive current inadequacies
of their capital stock or
differences in current profit rates.
It only means that there is
no mechanism to coordinate their
perceptions and decisions
towards a consistent, stable long r
un equilibrium position.
Keynes, like Marshall, approached the long
period to
sustain the notion of "normality"
(12). But "normality" is a
behavioral concept. It refers
to reactions that consistently
accompany a given stimulus. The la
tter have to be sufficiently
permanent or repetitive to allow age
nts to develop "normal"
behaviors. Investment of capital wou
ld fail this criterion. In
this case,
"(t)he outstanding fact is the extreme precario
usness of the
basis of knowledge on which our estimates of pr
ospective yield
have to be made. Our knowledge of the factors whi
ch will govern
the yield.of an investment some years hen
ce is usually very
slight anf often negligible." (Keynes, 1964, p. 149) (1
3).
The present is not then suffi
cient to "determine"
investment decisions:
"...regarding the marginal efficiency
of capital primarily in
terms of the current yield of cap
ital equipment...would be
correct only in the static state wher
e there is no changing
future to influence the present..." (Keyne
s, 1964, p. 145).
If investments were "primarily" decided in terms
of
current Gata one could postulate conditions under which long period
values would be obtained in the long run induced by those
12
conditions. Keynes, however, interposed the predominance of
personal interpretation, states of confidence, animal spirits,
between current conditions and investment decisions.
Under these conditions, long period equilibrium values
may exist potentially behind any short-period configuration. We
also may consider, as Keynes did, that if short and long period
values diverge, the economy will move toward another short-period
position and will keep moving as long as the divergence remains.
Nevertheless, there is no longer any necessary connection between
the long-period equilibrium values an external observer can
identify at any given moment and the specific strategies that
will be adopted by actual agents at that same moment. What
matters to Keynes is the "state of long-term expectations" rather
than "objective" long period conditions. (14) These long-period
values cannot then be called "normal" because they do not
correspond to the information that will be actually available to
agents. (15) Therefore, even if long-period values can be
calculated nothing can guarantee that they will become, in the
long run, "normal" values.
The difference between the concepts of run and period
was very clear to Keynes. In a debate with Hubert Henderson
about the influence of money supply Keynes noted that:
"the above deals with what happens in the long run, i.e. after
the lapse of a considerable period of time rather than in the
long period in the technical sense." (CWIMK, XXIX, p. 221).
Then Keynes proceeded to state that a long run
equilibrium situation might not exist (which was not the case of
long-period values "in the technical sen
se"):
"I should, I think, be prepared to argue that, ina wo
rld ruled
by uncertainty with an uncertain future linked to an actua
l
present, a final position of equilibrium, such as one d
eals with
in static economics, does not properly exist." (idem, p. 222)
That the question revolves around volition {in an
environment of uncertainty {s not open to doubt. In a letter to
Harrod, Keynes wrote in 1938 that
rs
"J also want to emphasize strongly the point about economics
being a moral science. I mentioned before that it deals with
introspection and with values. I might have added that it deals
with motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties. One
has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as
constant and homogeneous. It is as though the fall of the apple
to the ground depended on the apple's motives, on whether it is
worth while falling to the ground, on whether the ground wanted
the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of
the apple as to how far it was from the center of the earth."
(CWIMK, XIV, p. 300; see also p. 287).
But, what can one say about short-period equilibrium?
Would it not share the same nature as the long-period? for
Keynes, some crucial differences between the two notions could be
pointed out. Firstly, Keynes saw the short-period framework as
being closely related to the actual stage in which agents make
their decisions. It was not just an idealized scenery but a fair
rendering of the restrictions under which flesh-and-bones agents
would act. This is very clearly the meaning of the following
quotation:
"Thus we are supposing, in accordance with the facts, that at any
given time the productive processes set on foot, whether to
produce consumption goods or investment goods, are decided in
relation to the then existing capital equipment. But we are not
assuming that the capital equipment remains in any sense constant
from one accounting period to another. If we look at the
productive process in this way, we are, it seems to me, in the
closest possible contact with the facts and methods of the
business world as they actually exist; and at the same time we
have transcended the awkward distinction betweer the long and the
short period." (CWJMK, XXIX, pp. 64/5).
One should notice that the difference that is being
brought up to the fore is precisely that the
short-period
framework reproduces the actual environment where agents act,
while the long-period situation has no such "reality". They a
re
not, thus, equivalent concepts. They are notions of a different
nature. (16)
Even the {dea of equilibrium, {n the short period, is
more than just an analytical abstraction to Keynes. As he stated
in The General Theory, short-period decisions, like the decision
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to produce, are made in an essentially repetitive fashion
(Keynes, 1964, pp. 50/1). As long as the environment does not
significantly change, learning can originate a kind of
gravitation process toward equilibrium:
"Entrepreneurs have to endeavor to forecast demand. They do not,
as a rule, make wildly wrong forecasts of the equilibrium
position. But, as the matter is very complex, they do not get it
just right; and they endeavor to approximate to the true position
by a method of trial and error. (...) It corresponds precisely to
the higgling of the market by means of which buyers and sellers
endeavor to discover the true equilibrium position of supply and
demand." (CWJMK, XIV, p. 182).
One could doubt, then, whether it is really possible to
extend The General Theory to the long-period. Keynes's own use of
long-period notions in that work strengthen this feeling. The
long period is briefly introduced in the chapter on expectations
to state that "if we suppose a state of expectation to continue
for a sufficient length of time", the economy will reach the
level of employment that is entirely due to that state. This will
"be called the long-period employment corresponding to that state
of expectation" (Keynes, 1964, p. 48). It should be noticed
Keynes does not use the term "normal", as Marshall used to ie
refering to long-period values. This is probably due to the fact
that Keynes proceded from that definition to state that
"expectation may change so frequently" that precise level of
employment may never be attained in reality. In any case, as
Asinakopulos (1984/5; 1985) already pointed out, Keynes
discussion of this concept has the nature of an aside, without
any consequence for the model presented in his book.
The long period is back at the chapter 17, not as a
terminal, long run normal state, but as "a position towards which
forces spring up to influence the short-period position whenever
the latter has diverged from it" (CWJMK, XXIX, p. 54, quoted
above). The divergence refers to the market values of assets and
is reflected in the relation between their spotprices meee and forward
vatters i ees changes in their available stocks. What
S discussion {s how the stocks of the various
15
assets, including real capital assets, are change
d and Keynes did
not took his model to show any long-run equilibri
um prices of
assets. All that was introduced was the diver
gence to show how
changes in the economy are induced by it. (1
7) The operative
concept was always the state of long term expectat
ions, something
that "cannot be even approximately elimin
ated or replaced by
realised results" (Keynes, 1964, p. 51).
3. The Possibility of Normality
Marshall built his long-period analysis trying
to
obtain behavioral foundations to the notio
n of normality. Keynes
proposed that in an economy that operates under unce
rtainty to be
able to determine long-period values was no
t sufficient to
establish a long-run tendency to reach those val
ues.
For both Marshall and Keynes, the point of the idea of
normality was to explain the existence of rules,
the continuity
that economic life exhibitis, despite th
e fluctuations and
interruptions of activity that are also typical of capi
talism. As
observed by Keynes,
",,.it is an outstanding characteristic of the economic system in
which we live that, whilst it is subject to severe fluctuations
jn respect of output and employment, it is not violently
unstable. (...Fluctuations may start briskly but seem to wear
themselves out before they have proceeded to great extremes, and
an intermediate situation which is neither desperate nor
satisfactory {s our normal lot." (Keynes, 1964, pp- 249/50) .
Furthermore, in a 1936 letter to Joan Robinson, Keyn
es
had warned that one “must not confuse instability wit
h
uncertainty" (CWJMK, XIV, p. 137). The capitalist econom
y shows a
remarkable degree of stability for a system with the
characteristics Keynes described. In a sense, it is not the
explanation of fluctuations that should be the problem for
economists but of how a system like this simply does not collapse
under its own contradictions.
16
As we saw, for Keynes order and continuity wer
e not a
result of the “attraction" forces contained
in a long-run set of
equilibrium values. The divergence beetween
short and long
period results was sufficient to mov
e the system but not to
direct it toward any definite position.
This was so because
investment decisions were only partly inform
ed by current signals
and long run equilibrium values could not be tran
slated into
“motives and behaviors" of entrepreneurs their state of l
ong-term
expectations. Mostly, investment was determined by extremely
uncertain expectations that had no way to be coordinated among
different individual agents. Continuity (and normality) should,
thus, be explained in another way. According to Keynes,
continuity was actually guaranteed by "exogenous" factors:
"Now since these facts of experience (18) do not follow of
logical necessity, one must suppose that the environment and the
psychological propensities of the modern world must be of such a
character as to produce these results". (Keynes, 1964, p. 250).
Keynes went on to list four of these characteristics,
namely, that the multiplier is not very large; the investment
schedule is not very elastic with respect to a change in
expectations or in the interest rate; the money-wage rate is not
very sensitive to changes in the level of employment; and that
changes in investment tend to react on the marginal efficiency of
capital in such a way as to counteract the initial impulse
(Keynes, 1964, pp. 250/1).
These features refer basically to the "psychological
propensities of the modern world". To those we should add a very
important concept developed elsewhere in The General Theory, the
notion of convention. This is
".,.0ur usual practice...to take the existing situation and to
project it into the future, modified only to the extent that we
have more or less definite reasons for expecting a change. (...)
(T)he above conventional method of calculation will be cmpatible
with a considerable measure of continuity and stability in our
affairs, so Tong as we can rely on the maintenance of the




The notion of convention is the closest substitute
Keynes offered to the concept of "normal" values. It isolates a
very important characteristic of behavior under uncertainty: its
"stickiness". Agents form expectations in terms of sets of
possibilities instead of point-expectations. Disappointment
follows only when results really "surprise" agents, as Shackle
would put it, meaning that not only they are different from what
was expected to be the most probable result but they are also
outside the set of “a priori" reasonable outcomes. Convention
may cover production decisions, where permanence of the
environment is largely a safe assumption, but also more complex
factors like relative wages. (19)
As important as the 'right' psychology are the features
of the environment that strengthen continuity. Foremost among
these features are institutions created to reduce or socialize
uncertainty, coordinating plans and activities. The most
important of them is the emergence of forward contracts
denominated in money connecting the present to the future (20).
To sustain a system of forward contracts one also needs to define
a monetary standard endowed with rules of management that limit
the future behavior of the monetary unit. In addition, there are
also material elements of continuity, such as long-lived capital
goods which limit, at any given moment of time, the range of
alternatives that are open to agents.
Even technical change, which used to be stressed as a
factor of discontinuity by authors like Schumpeter, may have the
opposite role. As Nathan Rosemberg has stressed, there are
strong continuity elements to be considered in the study of
technical progress. (21)
Finally, im modern capitalist economies, one cannot
forget the action of the State in informing and coordinating
economic agents and assuring them "normal" business
wlll be maintained.
conditions
All these “environmental and psychological" factors are
agents can
without reference to long-periodequilibrium values that cannot be operational at
level. As suggested elsewhere,
of the short perfod rather than
79n).
suffictent to create a stable framework within which
form a picture of "normality"
the behavioral
Keynesian normality is a feature
the long (Carvalho, 1988, P-
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4. Conclusions
To take Keynes's assumptions at th
eir face value implies
that a long-period analysis “
in the old sense" has no place i
n
his model of a Monetary Economy
.
Marshall introduced the concept
to tame the analysis of
economic behavior in a context o
f uncertainty. To do it, it wa
s
required that "certain condition
s” were to be present. The main
one was, naturally, the persistence
, in time, that is, in the
long run, of the determinants of that
position. That persistence
would allow those values to become "
normal", in the sense of
being entirely adequate to those c
onditions.
Keynes considered that persistence incom
patible with
the assumption of uncertainty, empt
ying the long-period model of
its behavioral content. The knowledge of lon
g-period equilibrium
values is not at the reach of actual agents and there
fore does
not influence their behavior. What matters is the
ir long term
expectations rather than long-period values and th
ere is no way
the environment can make those two sets compatible. In cont
rast,
short term expectations can gravitate around s
hort-period
equilibrium because for the latter, the restrictions of the mod
el
coincide with the restrictions under which actual, real-wor
ld
agents are supposed to make their decisions. Moreover,
short-period factors are relatively persistent compared to the
number of times the corresponding decisions are made, allowing
agents to develop an adequate perception of their surrounding
conditions.
The concept of normality, then, is developped by Keynes
independently of long-period concerns, based on features of the
environment and of the way agents make their decisions. A
long-period analysis along the lines set by Keynes would demand
the study of the factors of continulty that connect each short
period to the next. A long-period model “in the old sense", no
matter what kind of theoretical innovation it may cointain, will







Joan Robinson seewed to evaluate this criticism differently.
She recognized that "(t)he Keynesian revolution destroyed
the basis of t(he neoclassical) concept of long-period
equilibrium and put nothing in its place” (Robinson, 1980,
p. 130). Nevertheless, her emphasis on the necessity of
introducing ‘historical time' in her theory led her to
downplay the relevance of contructions of this nature.
“The whole object of the accumulation of wealth is to
produce results, or potential results, at a comparatively
distent, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date.
Thus the fact that our knowledge of the future is
fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a
peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the
classical economic theory." (CWIMK, XIV, p. 113).
As Asimakooulos (1985, p. 627) has pointed out, Harrod
himself recognized that his model could be interpreted as
"introduc(ing) an assumption about how entrepreneurs would
behave" (Harrod, as quoted in Asimakopulos, ibid.). Harrod
also admitted, however, this would be inconsistent with
Keynesian views as to the influence of uncertainty in
economic processes. Consistency could only be obtained by
interpreting Harrod's variables as being "ex post" values
rather than behavioral ones (idem, p. 623).
One should notice that Keynes's “short period" theory of
employment did not develop through the examination of the
stability properties of the point of effective demand.
Demand failures are actually explained in a completely
different setting, discussing choices open to asset-holders
that will affect demand for real capital assets. Stability
properties of aggregate supply and demand equilibrium are
briefly refered to in chapter 3 of The Genera) Theory.




Pp There is no “correspondence principle" in




activities is stable in the sense of being sustainable
over
time, the point to be addressed is the relation betwe
en
expectations of proceeds by entrepreneurs and their actual
realisation. This point is not only not discussed in The
General Theory but it is actually disposed of as being a
secondary matter in Keynes's debates with Hawtrey (CWJMK,
XIV). Harrod's 1937 paper followed a similar path. The
determinants of the warranted growth rate are not behavioral
elements. Rather, they define consistency requirements of
equilibrium between aggregate supply and demand, not actual
determinants of agents behavior. This is specially clear
when one thinks of the accelerator, which shows how much
investment should grow to keep the desired rate of capacity
utilization. Nothing in Harrod's model, however, guarantees
that it will actually grow at that rate. As Joan Robinson
observed, “when we are concerned with an economy which is
off the steady path, the acceleration principle becomes a
great impediment to clear thinking." (Robinson, 1979, p.
134).
In this sense, the growth models developed by Kaldor,
Pasinetti, etc., do not address issues similar to those of
Keynes's General Theory. Paraphrasing Nell, those models
actually show “the interlocking of possibilities and
necessities, rather than of motives, plans and informatian"
(Nell, 1973, p. 200). For this reason, one cannot see them
as variants of the same basic model, being the long period
counterpart of Keynes's theory of employment as proposed by
Kregel (1976).
Marshall also conceived of a situation where random
influences could dominate price-determination. what he
called "market pericd" however was characterized by the
fixity of supply. Pricing then would be enteirely explained
by demand shifts and accidental disturbances. Market period
prices, however, are not equivalent to the Classical market
ces.











The Smportance of the distinction between “pericd" and “run”
was brought to my attention by Geoffrey Harcourt.
Keynes added a little later: “On my view, there is na unique
long-period position of equilibrium equally valid regardless
of the character of the policy of the monetary authority."
(CWJMK, XXIX, p. 55).
Ihe substitutability between capital and liquid (monetary)
assets Is emphasized in many points of The General Theory,
and formally modeled in its chapter 17. See Keynes, 1964,
pp. 160/1; 212/33; 226/7 and 5357/8. The substitutability
between money and goods had already been raised in a 1933
draft of The General Theory (CWJMK, XXIX, pp. 84/6) although
not yet in a portfolio choice framework.
The classic statement of the relationship be
tween
uncertainty and the demand for money as an asset is Key
nes's
1937. The General Theory of Employment (CWIMK, X
IV, pp-
108/23).
Keynes had written that “By means of the distinction between
the long and the short period, the meaning of ‘normal'
value was made precise” (CWJMK, VII, Pp. 207).
Keynes's inclination to develop concepts that could reflect
what takes place in "the real world" was already clear i
n
the way he chose sides in the Malthus/Ricardo debate. See,
e.g., CWIMK, X, p. 87: “|. .Malthus was already disposed to a
certain line of approach in handling practical economi
c
problems which he was to develop later on his correspondence
with Ricardo, - a method which to me is most sympathetic,
and, as I think, more likely to lead to right conclusions
than the alternative approach of Ricardo."
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(14) When forming expectations an agent builds a scenario of the
(20) See Davidson (1978a; 1978b, pp. 57, 60). Also CWJMK, vol.
future within which he locates his own expected position.
XXVIII, p. 255: "The Introduction of a money, in terms of
The divergence between short and long period values could
which loans and contracts with a time element can be
show itself by falsifying his forecasts of scenarios, even
expressed, is what really changes the economic status of a
if the particular results he achieves coincide with what was
' primitive society". Also, CWJMK, vol. V, p.1.
expected leading him to seek for aedditicnal
changes of
strategy. | (21) One can cite the concept of “technological traject
ory", in
which one recognizes that technological revolutions tend to
(15) The non-repetitive nature of an investment decision was the f unfold
gradually. As noted by Rosemberg, "in their earliest
cornerstone of Shackle's Pioneer efforts to criticize the . | stages, innovat
ions are often highly imperfect and are known
use of probability notions to approach uncertainty. See | to be so" (Rosenberg, 1982, p. 108). In addi
tion, learning
Shackle, 1952. j by doing and learning by using are also sources of technical
| change that suppose continuity rather than discontinuity.
(16) "Long pericd equilibrium is not at some date in the future; Rosemberg goes as fa
r as to argue that even science should
it is an imaginary state of affairs in which there are no mot be seen as entirely exogenous to the economic system
incompatibilities in the existing situation, here and now." (idem, ch. 7). These factors
are examined in detail in
Joan Robinsen, quoted in Asimakopulos, 1978, p. 264).
Possas, 1988.
(17) Even before The General Theory Keynes had all but ignored (22)
This is why, as Kregel has suggested, Keynes's break with
long pericd analysis. His position, however, was, in a the Marshallian mode of analysis may be seen as being more
sense, more nihilistic. The long pericd was suggested to be radical than Harrod's a
nd other post Keynesian growth
irrelevant, as in his famous remark in the Tract that in the theorists, who maintain a way of workin
g out long period
long run we would all be dead or in the focus on transition | models that is much closer to Marshall's than to Keynes's.
(disequilibrium) periods in the Treatise on Money and in his
early writings on the crisis of the 30s, collected in
volumes XIII and XX of his Collected Writings.
(18) He is referring to the already quoted remark that the system
dees not show violent instability.
(19) The conventional method is a form of those “well-established h
rules of thumb (we know to) exist in the business world,
that pay-off pericds, or desired or target rates of return,
for example, fall’ within definite ranges, where exactly
depending on expectations, confidence and the extent and
intensity of uncertainty at any moment of time. We know
that wage-earners have concepts of what is fair in relative
wage structures, and in the overall share of wages, too..."
(Harcourt, 1982, P- 219).  
REFERENCES
A. Asimakopulos, Microeconomics, Toronto:
Oxford University
press, 1978.
A. Asimakopulos, "Harrod on Harrod: the evolution of ‘a
line of
steady growth'", History of Political Economy, (17),
4, 1985.
A. Asimakopulos, ""Long-period employment" in The General T
heory,
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, VII (2), Winter
1984/5
A.Asimakopulos, "Keynes and Sraffa: Visions and Perspectives",
Political Economy, the Surplus Approach, I (2), 1985.
K.Bharadwaj, "The Subversion of Classical Analysis: Alfred
Marshall's early writing on value", Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 2, 1978.
Es Carvalho, "Keynes on Probability, Uncertainty and
Decision-Making", Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, XI (1),
Fall 1988.
P. Davidson, Money and the Real World, London: MacMillan, 2nd
edition, 1978a.
P. Davidson, "Why money matters: lessons from a half-cent
ury of
monetary theory", Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, I (1),
Fall 1978b.
j.fatwell, "The irrelevance of returns to s
cale in Sraffa's
analysis", Journal of Economic Literature, March 1
977.
P. Garegnani, "On a change in the notion of equilibri
um in recent
work in value and distribution", in M. Brown et alli
(ed.),
Essays in Modern Capital Theory, Amsterdam: N
orth-Holland, 1976.
P. Garegnani, "Notes on consumption, investment and
effective
demand", Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2 and 3, 1978/9.
G. Harcourt, The Social Science Imperialists. Sele
cted Essays.
Edited by P. Kerr. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1982.
R. Harrod, "An essay in dynamic theory", Economic Journal, XLIX,
1939.
J.M.Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1964.
oe Keynes, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes.
ee MacMillan and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971
1983. Volumes are refered WIMK f. th
number in Roman characters. aa
25)
J.kregel, Rate of Profit, Distribution and Growth: Two Views,
London: MacMillan, 1971.
J. Kregel, “Economic Methodology in the Face of Uncertainty",
Economic Journal, June 1976.
J. Kregel, “On the existence of expectations in English
neoclassical economics", Journal of Economic Literature, XV (2),
June 1977.
J. Kregel, "The microfoundations of the ‘generalisation of the
General Theory' and ‘bastard keynesianism': Keynes's theory of
employment in the long and in the short period", Cambridge
Journal of Economics, VII, 1983.
A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, London: MacMillan, Eighth
edition, 1920.
E.Nell, "Theories of Growth and Theories of Value", in G.
Harcourt and N. Laing (eds.) Capital and Growth, Harmonds
worth:
Penguin, 1973.
F. Northrop, "Introduction" to W. Heisemberg, Physics
and
Philosophy: the Revolution im Modern Science, New York: H
arper
and Brothers, 1962.
M. Possas, “Em direcdo a um paradigna microdinamico: a abordagem
neo-schumpeteriana", Campinas: mimeo, 1988.
J. Robinson, The Accumulation of Capital, London: MacMillan,
Third edition, 1969.
J. Robinson, Economic Heresies, New York: Basic Books, 1971.
J. Robinson, "Keynes and Ricardo", Journal of Post Keynesian
Economics, I(1), Fall 1978.
J. Robinson, The Generalisation of the General Theory and other
essays, London: MacMillan, 1979.
J. Robinson, ‘What are the Questions’ and other essays, Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1980.
N.Rosemberg, Inside the Black Box. Technology and Economics,
Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1982.
P. Samuelson, foundations of Economic Analysis, New York:
Atheneum, 1979.
G. Shackle, Expectation in Economics, Cambridge:
University Press, 1952. Cambridge





183. TAUILE,José Ricardo. Novos Padrdes Tecnoldgicos, Compe-
titividade Industrial e Bem Estar Social: Perspecti-
vas Brasileiras. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Dis
cussao, 183). 47
184. Lima, Fernando Carlos G.de Cerqueira; GOMES, Maria Cé-
lia. Sistema Financeiro da Habitacao: Limites de Ex-
pansao_de_um Sistema Especializado. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de
Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 184) 65
185. FERRAZ, Jodo Carlos. A Heterogeneidade Tecnolégica da
Indistria Brasileira: Perspectivas e Implicagoes para
Polftica. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao,
185). 34
186. TIGRE, Paulo Bastos. How Does Latin America Fit Into
High Technology?. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989.
Discussao, Tee
187. RUSH, Howard J. Manufacturing Strategies and Govern-
ment Policies. IEI, , Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Dis-
cussao, 187) 19
16
188. MAGALHAES, Paulo; SILVEIRA, Caio Marcio L.P. da; MAGA-
LHAES, Maria Alice E. Pr Governamentais de
Autoconstrugao no Brasil: Um Estudo Camparativo. IEI/
UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 188) 43
189. PENA, Maria Valéria Junho. O Estado das Informagoes So-
bre a Mulher no Brasil - uma avaliacgao. IEI/UFRJ,Rio
de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 189)
190. TAVARES, Maria da Conceigao. A Politica Econémica do




191. AZEREDO, Beatriz; OLIVEIRA, Pedro Jorge de. Fontes de
Recursos para o Or¢amento da Seguridade Social TEI7
UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao 191) 48
192, VIANNA, Maria Licia Teixeira Werneck. O Pos:Obrigac&o Politica e Suas JustificativaswesteoTegiesna Teoria Classica. TEI/UFRJ, Ri janeiro
(Discussao, 192 ed « BB,
43
4 -D, 1989. P.3
 
Ne de




SEeeeeSe Jonas;SILVEIRA,Caid | 205. LUSTOSA, Tania Quiles de 0. & FIGUEIREDO, José BernardoPaulo; pe "Maria Celia e BASTOS, Carlos M. | B. de. Pobreza no Brasil: Métodos de Andlise e Resul
ees a da; ae Handeacaote Habitacio- tados. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao , 205) 58
3 Di tico e Per: vas. IEI/ 5 5nais ster Road ca (Discasssa; ad 49 206. FIGUEIREDO, José Bernardo. Exportacdes, consumo pessoal
UFRJ, janeiro, e estrutura de producgao: algumas s Coes para °
194. BATISTA, Jorge Chami. The Conditions for a Foreign Brasil. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao,206) 2
~ Exchange Constrained + A Critique of Joshi's 16 | 207. MEDEIROS, Carlos. ReestruturagSo industrial
e
conflitoJaneiro, 1989. (D: 4 : ' : lus eModel. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de ° iscussao, 194) distributivo na econania italiana. IEI/UFRJ, Riode
195. FIORI, José Luis. Brasil: Uma _transigao democratica com Janeiro, 1989, (Discussa0, 207) 42
crise organica do Estado. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro,
1989. (Discussao, 195) 38 208. BATISTA, Jorge Chami e PAULA, Germano Mendes de. Avalia
Aloisio; AZEREDO, Beatriz; MATSUTANI, Mauricio: Bo 2 was tecnolégicas das estatais196. TEIXEIRA sio; D ; 7 iz tivast o AG SEtae SL oa
FAVERET, Paulo; OLIVEIRA, Pedro Jorge de, O financiamen produtivas: o-caso siderlirgico 7RLO
 
e e de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 20
to da seguridade sotial em 1989: novos caminhos, velhos ) 67
peoples. TEI/UFRI, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. Discussao, 209. FIORI, José Luis. Para uma critica da teoria do Estado19 63 Latinoamericano. IEI, , Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Dis
cussao, 209 = 61
197. BATISTA, Jorge Chami. Structural Deficits, The Debt Cycle }
Hypothesis and the Transfer of Real Resources. SEE, 210. P Adriano e CAULLIRAUX, Heito: s
Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discasss0, 197) 23 eee eee Oe, ceeengragao integrada: um novo padrao de orgaaeeO da
? EI, ‘ le Janeiro, . iscus—
198. PEREIRA, Edgard Antonio e ROMANO, Ricardo. Politica Anti- OT “= s 5 38
inflacionaria e planos de estabilizarso: a experiencia
brasileira recente. TEI, 1 Rio de Ji » 1989. 211. HAGUENAUER, Lia. Competitividade: Conceitos e medidas.
(Discussao, 198) 93 Uma_resenha da b: afia recente com énfase no ca-
donat: 5 ‘ 50SSee, Rio de Janeiro, 1989.(Dis-ROCHNIK, Victor. Programas © S ‘a_moderniza¢gao e cussao, 211)
rm aifusso entradicionais. TE1/ ‘ .UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 199 68 212. CARVALHO, Fernando J, Cardim de,. Keynes and the long
a jod. IEI/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao,









trabalhador na literatura brasileira. IEI/
UFRJ, Rio de
Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 200)
43
é ises brasileiras.3 , Jos Lais. Sonhos russianos, C
r.
~ PIE/UFRI, Rio de Janeiro,
1989. (Discussao, 201) ‘
59
202. MEDICI, André Cezar. Urbanizagao e Estrutura
cional:
Alternativas metodologicas ‘a uma inv
estigagao. IEI/ ea
UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 202)
i-
203. MELO, Luis Martins de. O programa de apoia ao desenvolv.
|
mento tecnolégico da empresa nacional - PADTEN ~ (1973 -
1988). IEI/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 203) 34
204. SALGADO, Lucia Helena. As propostas deamoneta
ria internacional de Ss; a institucionalidade ausen
te de uma econania monetaria de producao. IEI/UFRJ, Rio
de Janeiro, 1989. (Discussao, 204 20
